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Notes and Comments
Young v. New York City Transit Authority:
Silencing the Beggars in the Subways
I. Introduction
At 5 p.m. the rush-hour ticket line at New York City's Port Au-
thority Bus Terminal wove through the customary wretched car-
nival of mendicants. One beggar twirled like a crazed ballerina
from commuter to commuter, caressing people's shoulders and
prodding their bellies with a beseeching hand. Another rolled his
wheelchair up against the commuters' feet and tugged at their
sleeves. A third stretched across a counter in a weirdly feline ges-
ture, trying to intercept the change coming back to Mike Farrell,
50, of Ringwood, N.J. "No!" howled Farrell, loud enough to make
heads turn. "It's the only way you can get through to them," he
explained.'
In May 1990, the Second Circuit found yet another way to
"get through to them" in Young v. New York City Transit Au-
thority.2 The court was required to address the First Amend-
ment rights afforded beggars3 and panhandlers" in the New York
City subway system. The court reviewed an amended transit au-
thority regulation, title 21, section 1050.6 of the New York Com-
pilation of Codes, Rules, and Regulations (21 N.Y.C.R.R. §
1. Priscilla Painton, New York City, U.S.A.; Shrugging Off The Homeless; The na-
tion's toughest urbanites lose patience with the down-and-out, TIME, April 16, 1990, at
14.
2. 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990).
3. "Beggar" has been defined as "[olne who lives by begging charity, or who has no
other means of support than solicited alms." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 155 (6th ed. 1990).
4. The definition of "panhandler" is "an able-bodied street beggar." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 1630 (3d ed. 1976).
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1050.6),1 which continued the Transit Authority's long-standing
ban against begging and panhandling in the New York City sub-
way system, but was revised to allow qualified charitable organi-
zations to solicit funds in certain areas.8
In a two to one decision, the Second Circuit held the regula-
tion constitutional. 7 This decision reversed the holding of the
district court, which had held 21 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1050.6 to be a
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction and had perma-
nently enjoined enforcement of the regulation in the New York
City transit system.8 The Court of Appeals expressed "grave
doubt" that begging and panhandling were forms of speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment." It held that even if these activ-
ities were worthy of First Amendment protection, this regulation
would still be reasonable given the substantial governmental in-
terest in maintaining passenger safety and the availability of al-
ternative forums in which beggars could express themselves. 10 In
November 1990, the United States Supreme Court denied the
plaintiffs' petition for certiorari."
As the first federal decision addressing the First Amend-
ment rights of beggars, this case is likely to serve as precedent
for future decisions. Indeed, there are only a limited number of
state court decisions addressing the First Amendment rights of
beggars and panhandlers." It has been suggested that the dearth
of cases may be due to the beggars' lack of financial resources to
pursue court action to enforce their constitutional rights."
It is questionable whether this decision will be able to pro-
vide strong guidance for factually similar cases. The Court of
Appeals' decision is fraught with weaknesses. The decision fails
to take a definitive position in addressing the issue of whether
5. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.6(6) (1976).
6. Young, 903 F.2d 146.
7. Id. at 164.
8. Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
9. Young, 903 F.2d at 161.
10. Young, 903 F.2d at 157, 161.
11. See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990).
12. See infra notes 82-98 and accompanying text.
13. See C.C.B. v. State, 458 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). In addressing
the lack of cases in the state of Florida, the Florida District Court of Appeal "opine[d]
that such scarcity is due to this particular segment of society not having the ability or
wherewithal to pursue the challenge." Id. at 48.
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begging is a protected First Amendment activity. The decision
also fails to deal with the inefficiency and possible ineffective-
ness of the judgment with respect to enforcement.
Section II of this Note provides the background law con-
cerning solicitation by charitable organizations and by individu-
als soliciting funds for themselves. Section III discusses the
facts, procedural history, and Court of Appeals' decision in
Young v. New York City Transit Authority. Section IV analyzes
the Court of Appeals' reasoning with respect to both the major-
ity and dissenting opinions. Section V concludes that while the
court's holding banning begging and panhandling in New York
City's subway system may be proper in light of the governmen-
tal interest in passenger safety, the weaknesses in the decision
raise questions concerning its value as precedent. The Supreme
Court, by refusing to hear the case or provide any comment ex-
plaining its reasons for denying certiorari, has only delayed pass-
ing judgment on what it will ultimately have to decide, namely,
the First Amendment rights due beggars and panhandlers in
public areas of the United States.
II. Background
A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution de-
fines the extent to which Congress may limit an individual's
right to free speech: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances.""
Justice Cardozo once referred to freedom of speech as "the
matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of
freedom."1 5 It has been suggested that freedom-of speech should
occupy a preferred position, 6 though not an absolute one.1 7 In
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
16. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent argued:
The First Amendment requires the Government to justify every instance of
abridgment. That requirement stems from our oft-stated recognition that the
1992]
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any case, it is undeniable that the First Amendment is of para-
mount importance given its effect on individual freedom. 8
Since the enactment of the First Amendment, however, the
proper interpretation of the Framers' intent has often been sub-
ject to debate. 9 Specifically, the debate has addressed what con-
stitutes speech.2" Not all conduct constitutes speech that is pro-
tected by the First Amendment.2' Just because it may be
possible to find a "kernel" of expression in almost every activity
First Amendment was designed to secure "the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources," and "to assure the unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people." . . . If the Government cannot adequately justify abridgment of
protected expression, there is no reason why citizens should be prevented from
exercising the first of the rights safeguarded by our Bill of Rights.
Id. (citations omitted and emphasis in original). See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 115 (1943) ("Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a pre-
ferred position.").
17. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971) ("The First and Fourteenth
Amendments have never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual to
speak whenever and wherever he pleases, or to use any form of address in any circum-
stances that he chooses.").
18. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to
the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity
essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional
system.").
19. See JOHN E. NOWAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA, AND J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 833 (3d ed. 1986) (proposing that many of the problems with interpretation
of the First Amendment may be attributed to the lack of records in the House or Senate
at the time of its ratification).
20. Speech has been defined as "the act of speaking; communication or expression of
thoughts in spoken words." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2189 (3d
ed. 1976).
21. Although the Court recognizes the communicative nature of conduct, when con-
duct involves more than just the communication of ideas it may still be vulnerable to
state regulation. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning of draft
card held to be conduct not worthy of First Amendment protection); Adderly v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39 (1966) (holding student demonstrators protesting a schoolmates' arrest to be
conduct not protected by First Amendment because the students were blocking a jail
driveway and trespassing on nonpublic property and the state has right to control use of
its own property for its own purpose); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (upholding a
statute which prohibits picketing near a courthouse as a valid regulation of conduct and
not violative of free expression given the possibility that judges and juries could be influ-
enced by demonstrators); but see Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (attaching
peace symbol to flag held to be protected conduct); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131
(1966) (holding silent demonstration by five black people in public room of library con-
cerning segregation policy to be protected conduct).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss2/6
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does not mean that this "kernel" is sufficient to bring the activ-
ity within First Amendment protection." Justice Scalia has im-
plied that common sense should play a role in determining
whether First Amendment protection should be afforded to dif-
ferent forms of speech.23 The First Amendment affords protec-
tion to individuals to "speak, write, print or disseminate infor-
mation or opinion .... "' Thus, "[r]egulation of conduct bearing
no necessary relationship to the freedom to speak, write, print or
distribute information or opinion does not abridge the guaran-
tees of the First Amendment. '25 In addition, the government has
the right to protect its citizens from unwanted exposure to cer-
tain methods of expression, such as those that create a public
nuisance.26
22. Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24 (1989). The First Amendment issue in
Stanglin concerned a city ordinance which restricted admission in certain dance halls to
persons between the ages of fourteen and eighteen. The statute was challenged as a vio-
lation of the First Amendment freedom of association because the ordinance prohibited
people in these age groups from expressive association with people in other age groups.
The Court found that the activity of the patrons was merely recreational dancing and,
therefore, the statute was not an infringement of the petitioners' First Amendment right
of association. Id.
23. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Watt, demonstrators, in an effort to bring attention to
the plight of the homeless, challenged a park service anti-camping regulation which pro-
hibited sleeping in certain areas around the nation's capital. The majority held this ex-
pressive conduct to be protected by the First Amendment. In his dissent, Justice Scalia
stated, " ... scholarly discussion of this basic constitutional guarantee has strayed from
common and common-sense understanding." Id. at 622. He also stated that although the
Constitution provides "special protection against all laws that impinge upon spoken or
written communication[,] . . . to extend equivalent protection against laws that affect
actions which happen to be conducted for the purpose of 'making a point' is to stretch
the Constitution not only beyond its meaning but beyond reason, and beyond the capac-
ity of any legal system to accommodate." Id.
24. Ulmer v. Municipal Court for Oakland-Piedmont J.D., 127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
25. Id.; see Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951) (upholding ordinance
prohibiting door-to-door solicitation except by occupant consent); Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 160-65 (1939) (invalidating city ban on all distribution of leaflets).
26. Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 805 (1984) (upholding city prohibition on the posting of all signs on public
property).
5
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B. Speech vs. Conduct
1. What "Speech" is Protected by the First Amendment?
The courts have established different tests to determine
whether certain activities should be protected under the free-
dom of speech doctrine. 7 In order for expressive conduct to be
protected as a form of speech under the First Amendment, the
two-prong test developed by the Supreme Court in Spence v.
Washington"8 must be applied. The first prong of the test re-
quires a court. to determine whether there exists an intent to
convey a "particularized message."29 The second prong requires
a determination as to whether the likelihood is great that the
message being conveyed will be understood by those who are ex-
posed to it.30 Expressive conduct is speech worthy of First
Amendment protection when both prongs are satisfied.3 1
27. See R. George Wright, The Unnecessary Complexity of Free Speech Law and
the Central Importance of Alternative Speech Channels, 9 PACE L. REV. 57, 59-88 (1989)
(discussing the myriad of tests developed by the courts to determine whether free speech
restrictions should be imposed).
28. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
29. Id. at 410.
30. Id.
31. The defendant in Spence hung the United States flag out of his apartment win-
dow. The flag was positioned upside down and a peace symbol was taped to it. The
defendant claimed that he had displayed the flag in this manner in protest against cur-
rent events, specifically, the invasion of Cambodia and the Kent State University kill-
ings. He claimed that in displaying the flag in this manner, he was trying to convey the
message that the flag was a symbol of peace, not of war and violence. Id. at 408.
The lower courts convicted Spence of violating an "improper use" statute, which
prohibited displaying the United States flag with anything attached to it. Id. The Su-
preme Court reversed the conviction concluding that the defendant's act "was not [one]
of mindless nihilism. Rather, it was a pointed expression of anguish by appellant about
the then-current domestic and foreign affairs of his government .... [I]n the surrounding
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those
who viewed it." Id. at 410-11.
In applying the two-prong test to the facts of the case, the Court found the first
prong of the test to be satisfied. Since the timing of the defendant's activity was almost
simultaneous with the events in Cambodia and Kent State, the Court found the defend-
ant's intent to convey a message clearly established. The Court also found that it was
likely that the majority of citizens who saw the flag would understand the defendant's
message. Id. at 410-11. Moreover, the Court found that no state interest was impaired by
the defendant's activity because the tape was removable, the flag was privately owned,
and the message was clear. The Court found that there was no risk of misleading viewers
that the defendant's view was endorsed by the government. As a result, the defendant's
actions were worthy of protection..Id. at 412-13.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss2/6
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2. Judicial Review of Government Restrictions of Speech
Once it has been established that the activity being consid-
ered is a form of expressive conduct, one must then determine
what level of scrutiny the judiciary should apply in evaluating
the regulation restricting the activity. There are two different
levels of scrutiny used in the analysis of government restrictions
on expressive conduct.3 2 The first level of scrutiny, commonly
referred to as strict scrutiny, is appropriate for laws which are
directed at the communicative nature of the conduct;3" these are
content-based restrictions. Such laws can only be justified upon
a showing of a compelling governmental interest.3 4 The second
level of scrutiny is appropriate for laws which proscribe specific
conduct in order to protect a governmental interest that is unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression;35 these are content-
neutral restrictions. Under this test, a prohibition of speech can
be held reasonable upon a showing of a substantial governmen-
tal interest.3 6
3. The O'Brien Test
In United States v. O'Brien,3 the Supreme Court held that
"when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the
same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify inciden-
tal limitations on First Amendment freedoms."" s The O'Brien
32. Tribe refers to these two levels as track one and track two, or the "two track"
analysis. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 (2d. ed. 1988).
33. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (overturning a conviction under a
Texas statute prohibiting the desecration of the American flag on an unconstitutional as
applied basis).
34. Id. at 403.
35. Id.
36. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 376. In O'Brien, the defendant burned his draft card in public to express
antiwar beliefs and encourage others to adopt those beliefs. Id. Under § 462(b)(3) of the
Universal Military Training and Services Act of 1948, as amended in Congress in 1965, a
person "who forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner
changes any such certificate" is guilty of an offense under the statute. 50 U.S.C. app. §
462(b) (1965). O'Brien was convicted under this statute for burning his Selective Service
Registration Certificate. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369. O'Brien challenged the constitutional-
ity of the Act. The Court found that the government interest in maintaining an efficient
selective service system outweighed the defendant's right of free expression in this situa-
1992]
7
PACE LAW REVIEW
Court set forth four factors which must be satisfied in order to
justify a government regulation restricting First Amendment
rights. Specifically, a government regulation is justified:
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2]
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.a9
Whereas the first and fourth factors of the O'Brien test are
not difficult for a court to determine, factors two and three re-
quire more careful scrutiny. The second factor, the advancement
of a substantial governmental interest, involves a subjective de-
termination by the court. The third factor of the O'Brien test
suggests a content-neutral requirement. This is the "threshold
inquiry" 0 of the analysis, 41 and it requires the court to deter-
mine "whether the dangers relied on as justification for the regu-
lation arise at least in some measure from the alleged communi-
cative content of the conduct."42
4. Forum Considerations
The type of forum in which the conduct takes place will also
be considered when determining whether the First Amendment
restriction is justified.43 There are three types of forums: tradi-
tion. Id.
39. Id. at 377.
40. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989). "The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality ... is whether
the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys .... A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of
expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or
messages but not others." Id.
41. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407.
42. Young, 903 F.2d at 158-59.
43. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988).
To ascertain what limits, if any, may be placed on protected speech, we have
often focused on the "place" of that speech, considering the nature of the forum
the speaker seeks to employ. Our cases have recognized that the standards by
which limitations on speech must be evaluated "differ depending on the character
of the property at issue."
Id. at 2499 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44
(1983)). See also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799
[Vol. 12:359
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tional public forums, designated public forums, and nonpublic
forums.4 Traditional public forums include places which by
"long tradition or by government fiat" have been devoted to as-
sembly and debate.45 Public streets and parks are examples of
traditional public forums.4 If a forum is public, free speech can
only be restricted "when the exclusion is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to
achieve that interest. 47
A public forum may also be created "by government desig-
nation of a place ... for use by the public at large for assembly
and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of
certain subjects."4 However, a public forum is not created by
"inaction or by permitting limited discourse .... [There must be
an intentional] opening of a nontraditional forum for public dis-
course. 49 In an area that has been designated a public forum,
"speakers cannot be excluded without a compelling government
interest."50
The third type of forum, non-public forums, involves "pub-
lic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for
public communications."'5 1 United States mailboxes and military
forts are examples of non-public forums.2 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held in Gannett Satellite Information Net-
work v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority" that the pub-
lic areas of a train station could also fall under this third cate-
(1985) ("Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all
times.").
44. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)
(holding that a nonpublic forum did not require government showing of compelling in-
terest). See also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (finding no compelling in-
terest which would justify restriction on picketing on public sidewalks surrounding Su-
preme Court building); but see Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding ordinance prohibiting posting campaign
signs on street light posts because of the compelling government interest in aesthetics
and the environment).
48. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 800.
51. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
52. Id.; see also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
53. 745 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984).
1992]
9
PACE LAW REVIEW
gory.54 "Public property .... which is neither a traditional nor a
designated public forum, can still serve as a forum for First
Amendment expression if the expression is appropriate for the
property, and is not 'incompatible with the normal activity of a
particular place at a particular time.' 715
In order to determine whether a particular expression is ap-
propriate for a public property, one looks to see whether "the
expression is relevant to the property or if the property provides
the relevant audience. ' 5 6 If the court determines that "the ex-
pression is inappropriate for the property or is incompatible
with the intended use of the property, then the expression may
be totally barred and the property is considered a 'non-
forum.' 57
5. Time, Place, and Manner of Restrictions
Courts will also uphold certain limitations on expression
concerning time, place, and manner which are valid and justifia-
ble.5 8 Once a regulation is categorized as a time, place, or man-
ner restriction, the courts employ several tests to determine
whether the governmental restriction is valid. These tests in-
clude whether the restriction serves a significant governmental
interest, whether it is narrowly tailored to serve that interest,
and whether alternative forums exist. 9 Applying these tests,
54. Id. at 773.
55. Id. at 773 (citing Eastern Connecticut Citizens Action Group v. Powers, 723 F.2d
1050, 1054 (2d Cir. 1983)) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116
(1972)).
56. Id. at 773 (quoting Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 90 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968)).
57. Id.; See also Perry, 460 U.S. at 46-49.
58. For a discussion of the public forum doctrine and time, place, and manner re-
strictions, see Sara Simrall Rorer, Noncommercial Door-To-Door Solicitation and the
Proper Standard of Review for Municipal Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions, 55
FORDHAM L. REv. 1139 (1987); William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and
the Supreme Court: The Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expres-
sion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 757, 760 (1986) (suggesting that the court's scrutiny of the
regulations being examined should be heightened in order to ensure First Amendment
protection).
59. See Wright, supra note 27, at 59-88 (discussing the myriad of tests developed by
the courts to determine whether free speech restrictions should be imposed, focusing
primarily on the alternative forum consideration of time, place, and manner analyses).
Id.
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courts have held that a state may
reasonably regulate the time, place and manner of engaging in so-
licitation in public places in order to prevent fraud or undue har-
assment of passersby . . . . [However] the state must recognize
that individuals in public places cannot expect the same degree of
protection from contact with others as they are entitled to in
their own homes.6 0
C. Constitutional Protection of Begging?
The constitutional protection afforded the act of begging, in
which an individual solicits for himself, is still an unsettled issue
in the American court system. There is little case law in this
area.
6 1
The rights of representatives of organized charities to solicit
funds, however, is not as unsettled an issue. In 1980, the Su-
preme Court held in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Environment 2 that solicitation by charitable organiza-
tions is worthy of First Amendment protection. 63 In Schaum-
60. People v. Fogelson, 577 P.2d 677 (1978); see also Clark v. Community for Crea-
tive Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). In Clark, the petitioners obtained a permit to
conduct a demonstration relating to homeless issues in two parks in Washington, D.C.
Id. at 291-92. They pitched tents in the parks but were denied permission to sleep in the
tents. Id. at 292. This denial was based on the fact that camping in national parks was
restricted to designated camp grounds. Id. The petitioners claimed that sleeping in the
parks was a form of expression and that denial of this right was an infringement on their
First Amendment freedoms. Id. The Court upheld the time, place, and manner restric-
tion with respect to the plaintiff's symbolic conduct, finding the regulation to be content
neutral and supported by a substantial government interest (maintaining the parks in
good condition). Id. at 295, 298-99. The Court also noted the existence of available alter-
native channels in which the plaintiffs could communicate their message. Id. at 295.
61. Anthony J. Rose, Comment, The Beggar's Free Speech Claim, 65 IND. L.J. 191,
193-95 (1989). The author proposes that the lack of case law addressing the First
Amendment right of the beggar is partially due to the lack of commitment by the crimi-
nal justice system to convict beggars for begging ordinance violations. Id. For those cases
that are not dismissed and do go to trial, the author notes that these cases are often
given low priority status among both prosecutors and judges, which often results in the
foreclosure of the opportunity of appellate review. Id.
The author also notes that beggars typically lack the finances and the necessary
information to challenge an ordinance. Further, ordinances prohibiting begging have
strong roots in history and hence often carry a presumption of validity. Id. One final
practical reason explaining the lack of begging cases is that the cases can often be de-
cided without the need for the court to address the First Amendment issue. Id.
62. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
63. The term "charitable organizations" has been defined as
11
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burg, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a village ordi-
nance which prohibited door-to-door or on-street solicitation of
contributions by charitable organizations unless they allocated
at least seventy-five percent of their receipts to charity."' The
Court found the ordinance to be overbroad and thus
unconstitutional.6 5
The Court determined that the seventy-five percent rule
could not be applied to organizations whose primary goal is the
dissemination of information and gathering of support for a
cause, rather than gathering and distributing money for the
poor.6 The Court noted that fundraising is worthy of First
Amendment protection when its goal is communicating ideas
and gathering support for causes.
[C]haritable appeals for funds, on the street or door to door, in-
volve a variety of speech interests-communication of informa-
tion, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and
the advocacy of causes-that are within the protection of the
First Amendment. Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly
subject to reasonable regulation but the latter must be under-
taken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is character-
istically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive
speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular
views on economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality
that without solicitation the flow of such information and advo-
cacy would likely cease. Canvassers in such contexts are necessa-
[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and op-
erated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, lit-
erary, or educational purposes . . . no part of the net earnings of which inures to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is to carry on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 212 (5th Ed. 1979) (quoting I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
64. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 635; SCHAUMBURG, ILL., VILLAGE CODE ch. 22, art. III, §§
22-1 to -24 (1975). Section 22-20(g) of the ordinance required an organization to provide
proof that 75 percent of the proceeds will be allocated directly to charitable purposes
prior to issuing the organization a permit. Charitable purposes did not include: "(1) sala-
ries or commissions paid to solicitors; (2) administrative expenses of the organization,
including, but not limited to, salaries, attorneys' fees, rents, telephone, advertising ex-
penses, contributions to other organizations and persons, except as a charitable contribu-
tion and related expenses incurred as administrative or overhead items." SCHAUMBURG,
ILL., VILLAGE CODE ch. 22, art. III, § 22-20(g) (1975).
65. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 635.
66. Id.
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rily more than solicitors for money. 7
Absent a showing by the village of a "sufficiently strong, subor-
dinating interest," the Court held that a seventy-five percent
rule could not be sustained because it was a "direct and substan-
tial limitation on protected activity."
68
The Supreme Court struck down similar statutes that at-
tempted to regulate the activity of charitable solicitation in two
later cases, Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Mun-
son Co.69 and Riley v. National Federation of the Blind.70 In
Munson, the Court invalidated a Maryland statute which pro-
hibited allocating more than twenty-five percent of the funds
raised to be used for expenses.7" This restriction could be waived
if it were shown to have a significantly detrimental effect on the
charitable organization's ability to raise contributions. 72 Despite
the waiver provision, the Court held the statute unconstitutional
67. Id. at 632.
68. Id. at 636. The Court specifically noted that the 75 percent rule prevented those
organizations that are primarily aimed at advocacy or public interest rather than solicit-
ing of financial support from qualifying for a permit under the ordinance. In addition,
although the Court recognized the village's legitimate interest in preventing fraud
through the implementation of the 75 percent rule, it held that this goal could be accom-
plished through the enactment of narrowly drawn ordinances that did not interfere with
the First Amendment rights of charitable organizations. Id.
69. 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
70. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
71. Munson, 467 U.S. at 968. Munson, a professional fundraiser, challenged the stat-
ute after several of his customers were hesitant to continue their business relationship
with him. Munson charged these customers more than 25 percent of their gross receipts
and the Secretary of State had informed one of these groups that it would prosecute if
the group failed to comply with the 25 percent limitation. Id.
72. Id. at 962. The statute reads in pertinent part:
A charitable organization other than a charitable salvage organization may
not pay or agree to pay as expenses in connection with any fundraising activity a
total amount in excess of 25 percent of the total gross income raised or received by
reason of the fund-raising activity. The Secretary of State shall, by rule or regula-
tion in accordance with the "standard of accounting and fiscal reporting for volun-
tary health and welfare organizations" provide for the reporting of actual cost, and
of allocation of expenses, of a charitable organization into those which are in con-
nection with a fund-raising activity and those which are not. The Secretary of
State shall issue rules and regulations to permit a charitable organization to pay
or agree to pay for expenses in connection with a fund-raising activity more than
25% of its total gross income in those instances where the 25% limitation would
effectively prevent the charitable organization from raising contributions.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103D (1982).
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given the possible infringement on free speech privileges.73 Al-
though the Court recognized that the waiver provision might re-
sult in fewer First Amendment infringements, the percentage re-
quirement was held to be defective under the Schaumburg
rationale.7'
In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind,7 a coalition of
professional fundraisers, charitable organizations, and potential
charitable donors challenged the constitutionality of the North
Carolina Charitable Solicitations Act.76 They claimed that sev-
eral provisions of the Act infringed on their First Amendment
freedoms. 7 Specifically, the Act established a "reasonable fee"
schedule78 and required that the fundraisers provide potential
donors with information concerning the percentage of funds that
are actually directed to charity.79 The Act also required profes-
73. Munson, 467 U.S. at 968.
74. Id. For an in-depth discussion of Munson, see Jeffrey T. Zachmann, Note, Sec-
retary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co.: State Regulation of Charitable Fundraising
Costs, 5 PACE L. REV. 489 (1985).
75. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Under § 131C-17.2 of the statute, a fee of 20 percent or less of the gross receipts
collected would be reasonable; a fee between 20 and 30 percent would be unreasonable
absent a showing that the solicitation involved the "dissemination of information, discus-
sion, or advocacy relating to public issues as directed by the (charitable organization]
which is to benefit from the solicitation;" and a fee of 35 percent or more was presuma-
bly unreasonable. However, the fundraiser was allowed to rebut the presumption by
showing either that the fee was necessary because it involved the dissemination of infor-
mation or advocacy relating to public issues directed by the charity or because the ability
of the charity to solicit or communicate would be significantly diminished. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 131C-17.2(a)-(d) (1986).
79. Section 131C-16.1 states in pertinent part:
During any solicitation and before requesting or appealing either directly or indirectly
for any charitable contribution a professional solicitor shall disclose to the person
solicited:
(1) His name; and
(2) The name of the professional solicitor or professional fund-raising counsel by
whom he is employed and the address of his employer; and
(3) The average of the percentage of gross receipts actually paid to the persons
established for a charitable purpose by the professional fund-raising counsel or
professional solicitor conducting the solicitation for all charitable sales promotions
conducted in the State by that professional fund-raising counsel or professional
solicitor for the past 12 months, or for all completed charitable sales promotions
where the professional fund-raising counsel or professional solicitor has been solic-
iting funds for less than 12 months.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-16.1 (1986).
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sional fundraisers to obtain a license to solicit; volunteer fun-
draisers, however, were allowed to solicit immediately after sub-
mitting an application for a license.80  Recognizing the
constitutional protection afforded charities under the First
Amendment, the Court held the statute to be an unconstitu-
tional burden on free speech."1
There are a limited number of state court decisions address-
ing the First Amendment rights of the individual beggar or pan-
handler who solicits funds from the public for himself. In Ulmer
v. Municipal Court for Oakland-Piedmont J.D.,82 the California
Court of Appeal upheld a California penal law which prohibited
an individual from accosting another in a public place for the
purpose of begging.8 3 The challengers argued that the statute
was overbroad or, in the alternative, vague and indefinite.84 The
court reasoned that the purpose of the statute was to "protect
members of the public forum from the annoyance of being ap-
proached. 8 5 Using the word "accost" excluded the "blind or
crippled person who merely sits or stands by the wayside" or
other passive beggars.8 6 The court held that since "[b]egging and
soliciting for alms [does] not necessarily involve the communica-
tion of information or opinion . . . approaching individuals for
that purpose is not protected by the First Amendment. 87
The Florida District Court of Appeal afforded First Amend-
ment protection to begging in C.C.B. v. State.8 8 In C.C.B., a city
ordinance prohibited all forms of begging or soliciting funds by
80. Section 131C-6 states: "Any person who acts as a professional fund-raising coun-
sel or professional solicitor shall apply for and obtain an annual license from the Depart-
ment [of Human Resources], and shall not act as a professional fund-raising counsel or
professional solicitor until after obtaining such license." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-6 (1986).
81. Riley, 487 U.S. at 798.
82. 127 Cal. Rptr. 445 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
83. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(c) (West 1961) ("Every person who commits any of the
following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor: . .. (c) Who accosts other
persons in any public place or in any place open to the public for the purpose of begging
or soliciting alms.").
84. Ulmer, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
85. Id.
86. Id. The court reviewed the legislative history of the Act and noted that the Act
was intended to control the begging problem by prohibiting specific acts, and that any
regulation of the passive beggar or solicitor was left to local ordinances. Id. at 447.
87. Id.
88. 458 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
1992]
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individuals for themselves, whether in the streets or other public
areas." The court invalidated the statute and found it to be
more intrusive than necessary given its total ban on begging.9
Disagreeing with the reasoning in Ulmer, the court noted that "a
municipality under its police power may regulate and restrain
certain activities which threaten the public health, safety and
welfare, but the power to restrain and regulate does not include
the power to prohibit an activity which is not a nuisance per
se." Furthermore, the court noted that "[p]rotecting citizens
from mere annoyance is not a sufficient compelling reason to ab-
solutely deprive one of a First Amendment right."92 Given a suf-
ficient showing of governmental interest a regulation may re-
strict the right of an individual to exercise his freedom of
speech, but may not absolutely prohibit such activity.9 3
Solicitation by an individual for the purpose of obtaining
charitable donations for her own individual use was also ad-
dressed in People v. Tosch.94 In Tosch, a vehicular statute pro-
hibited individuals from soliciting in the road and stopping cars
to solicit rides or business. However, the statute allowed certain
qualified charitable organizations to do so under certain circum-
stances.9 5 The court held that "a State may treat different clas-
89. Id. JACKSONVILLE, FLA., MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE § 330.105 stated: "It shall be un-
lawful and a class C offense for anyone to beg or solicit alms in the streets or public
places of the city or exhibit oneself for the purpose of begging or obtaining alms."
90. C.C.B., 458 So. 2d at 50.
91. Id. (emphasis in original). The court held that "a total prohibition of begging or
soliciting alms for oneself is an unconstitutional abridgment of the right to free speech as
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution of the United
States and article I, section 4 of the Constitution of the State of Florida." Id.
92. Id.; see also Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (holding a ban on sidewalk
gatherings which were "annoying" to passersby to be unconstitutionally vague).
93. C.C.B., 458 So. 2d at 50.
94. 501 N.E.2d 1253 (Ill. 1986).
95. Id. at 1255. Under section 11-1006, subsection (c), of the Illinois Vehicle Code:
No person shall stand on a highway for the purpose of soliciting contributions
from the occupant of any vehicle except within a municipality when expressly per-
mitted by municipal ordinance. Solicitation on highways within this state shall be
allowed only at intersections where all traffic is required to come to a full stop.
The soliciting agency shall be:
1. registered with the Attorney General as a charitable organization...
2. engaged in a statewide fund raising activity; and
3. liable for any injuries to any person or property during the solicitation which is
causally related to an act of ordinary negligence of the soliciting agent.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, paras. 11-1006(c)(1)-(3) (1985).
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ses of persons differently, and absent a fundamental right may
differentiate between persons similarly situated if there is a ra-
tional basis for doing so." 96 The defendant failed to rebut the
reasonableness of the legislature's determination that solicita-
tion by charitable organizations provides benefits to the public
"which offset the risks inherent in solicitation on the highway."97
Therefore, the court held the statute's classification was "rea-
sonably related to a legitimate governmental objective" and,
thus, the statute was constitutionally valid.9 8
III. Young v. New York City Transit Authority
A. Facts and Procedural History
On November 28, 1989, the Legal Action Center for the
Homeless (LACH) 9 filed suit in federal district court against
the New York Transit Authority (TA) and the Metropolitan
Transit Authority (MTA).100 LACH represented itself and two
homeless men, who represented a class of homeless and needy
people that beg and panhandle in the New York City subway
system.101 The suit was commenced in response to the TA's re-
96. Tosch, 501 N.E.2d at 1256.
97. Id. at 1257. The court noted that "[wihether the course chosen by the General
Assembly to achieve a desired result is either wise or the best means available is not a
proper subject of judicial inquiry." Id. at 1257 (quoting Garcia v. Tully, 377 N.E.2d 10
(Ill. 1978)).
98. Tosch, 501 N.E.2d at 1257.
99. The Legal Action Center for the Homeless is a nonprofit organization providing
various legal and social services to homeless people. Young v. New York City Transit
Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 345 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
100. Young, 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). The court noted:
Plaintiffs originally named as defendant the MTA, the TA, Metro-North Com-
muter Railroad Company .... and Robert Kiley, Chairman of the TA, the MTA,
and Metro-North. The MTA, a public benefit corporation consisting of chairman
and sixteen other members appointed by the Governor with Senate advice and
consent, has responsibility for the continuation, development and improvement of
commuter transportation and other services related thereto in a district encom-
passing the city of New York and the counties of Dutchess, Nassau, Orange, Put-
nam, Rockland, Suffolk and Westchester.
Id. at 345 n.3 (quoting N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1262-64 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990)).
101. Id. at 345. A description of the plaintiffs, William B. Young, Jr. and Joseph
Walley, is provided in the brief for the plaintiffs-appellees:
Named plaintiff William B. Young, Jr. is homeless and frequently sleeps in public
shelters. If he can afford to, he rents a room for the night. He survives by asking
people for charity, and by unloading trucks and doing other work when he is able.
17
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cent amendment of 21 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1050.6,12 which was
amended to permit organized charities to solicit funds in the
subway system under certain circumstances, but continued to
ban beggars and panhandlers. 10 3 Approximately one week prior
to the effective date of the amended regulation, "Operation En-
forcement" 104 was launched to inform the public of the new rules
He does not currently receive any welfare, except for food stamps. He speaks with
people and asks them for money in subway stations, such as Grand Central, Times
Square, Herald Square, Union Square, Columbus Circle, Pennsylvania Station,
the World Trade Center and the Port Authority Bus Terminal. He also solicits
money on subway platforms and on the underground streets that connect stations
and platforms....
With the money he earns soliciting he purchases the basic necessities of life,
i.e., food, shelter, clothing, transportation, and medicine. Since he does not receive
public assistance, he is not on Medicaid. He has a bleeding ulcer and high blood
pressure. He often needs to take four pills each day for his ulcer and two pills for
his blood pressure. The ulcer pills cost about twenty dollars for a bottle of thirty
and the blood pressure pills cost about seven dollars for a bottle of thirty....
Named plaintiff Joseph Walley has been homeless and sleeping in shelters or
parks for over four and one-half years. He is fifty years old and unable to find
work. He receives food stamps and public assistance at the rate of ninety-one dol-
lars and fifty cents ($91.50) every two weeks. When he sleeps in a public shelter
this amount is reduced to twenty-one dollars and fifty cents ($21.50)....
Mr. Walley solicits money throughout the subway system, in the stations, on
the underground streets between stations and platforms, and on the platforms,
including Pennsylvania Station, Port Authority Bus Terminal, Grand Central,
Times Square, Herald Square and Columbus Circle....
Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellees at 6, Young v. New York City
Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990) (Nos. 90-7115, 90-
7137, and 90-7183).
102. Prior to its amendment, the statute prohibited any person, unless "duly au-
thorized" by the TA, from soliciting "upon any facility or conveyance. . . alms, subscrip-
tion or contribution for any purpose." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.6(b)
(1976).
103. The statute was amended by the addition of a new provision which authorized
certain nontransit uses. These newly permissible uses included "public speaking; distri-
bution of written materials; solicitation for charitable, religious or political causes; and
artistic performances, including the acceptance of donations." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.6(c) (1985).
Furthermore, certain time, place, and manner restrictions were placed on the
amended statute, prohibiting the newly authorized nontransit uses from areas "not gen-
erally open to the public and in subway cars." In addition, "[w]ith the exception of
leafletting or distributing literature, campaigning, public speaking or similar activities
with no sound production device and no physical obstruction, non-transit uses were also
prohibited within twenty-five feet of a token booth or within fifty feet from the marked
entrance to an TA office or tower." Young, 729 F. Supp. at 344.
104. "Operation Enforcement" was an information campaign launched by the TA on
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in the transit system. 10 5 Initially, the plaintiffs claimed that the
prohibition of begging and panhandling in the subway system
violated First Amendment rights to free speech, as well as due
process and equal protection.106 The plaintiffs also claimed that
the TA regulation violated the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution 10 7 and Article I, §§ 6, 8,
October 17, 1989. The TA distributed 1.5 million pamphlets warning that "anyone vio-
lating the new rules governing behavior in the transit system would be 'subject to arrest,
fine and/or ejection.'" Young, 729 F. Supp. at 344-45.
Panhandling and begging were included in the list of prohibited acts. In addition,
more than 20,000 posters helped publicize the campaign. One line on each of the posters
stated that panhandling or begging "would lead to arrest, fine and/or ejectment." Id. at
345.
105. Plaintiffs Young and Walley were among the first to feel the new rules' effects
when they "were ejected from several of the TA's stations for soliciting charity shortly
after the commencement of Operation Enforcement." Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellees
at 3, Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990) (Nos. 90-7115,
90-7137, and 90-7183).
106. Young, 729 F. Supp. at 345. The Plaintiffs alleged that the regulations and
rules were violative of their First Amendment rights to free speech both on their face
and as applied. Furthermore, they argued that the regulations were anti-loitering provi-
sions, and as such not only were violative of their due process rights but also served as a
pretext for evicting them and other homeless people similarly situated from the defend-
ants' jurisdiction. Id. at 349. In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs stated:
Defendants have violated plaintiffs' federal and state constitutional rights. De-
fendants have promulgated various rules, regulations and laws that ban members
of the plaintiff class from asking for charity, even as some of these allow all others
to ask for money for any charitable, religious or political cause. They amount to a
vague, overbroad, and content-based ban of speech in public forums, which serve
no legitimate government interest and which provide no alternative means of com-
munication, and thereby violate plaintiffs' rights of free speech. In addition, they
are an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, which vests unfettered discre-
tion in defendants to censor or permit speech. There is no rational basis, more-
over, for distinguishing between homeless or needy people, a politically disfavored
group, and all others soliciting for charity. The intended purpose is simply to
roust the homeless or needy from bus or subway stations or platforms, and other
public forums. This denies them equal protection of the law. In addition, the pe-
nal law creates a status offense and is void for vagueness. Finally, the rulemaking
power delegated to some of the defendants does not include within its scope the
authority to mak6 rules so intrusive of fundamental rights, and to the extent it
purports to, is unconstitutional.
Amended Complaint for the Plaintiffs at 2, Young v. New York City
Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (No. 89 Civ.
7871).
107. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution states:
SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
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and 11 of the New York State Constitution,0 8 as well as 42
U.S.C. § 1981109 and § 1983.110 The plaintiffs did not challenge
the TA regulation as an unconstitutional time, place, and man-
ner restriction."'
At oral argument on December 1, 1989, LACH argued that
begging was worthy of protection by the First Amendment be-
cause communication inevitably results when a homeless or
needy person extends his hand." 2 LACH also argued that there
was no distinction between solicitation by organized charities
and solicitation by private individuals." 3
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
108. Article 1 of the New York State Constitution states in pertinent part as follows:
§ 6. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law....
§ 8. Every citizen may speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subject, be-
ing responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain
or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press....
§ 11. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or
any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion,
be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by any
firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the
state.
N.Y. CONST., art. I, §§ 6, 8, 11.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1870) provides:
Equal rights under the law. All persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides:
Civil action for deprivation of rights. Every person who, under color of any stat-
ute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or sage, of any State or Territory or the Dis-
trict of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applica-
ble exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
111. Young, 729 F. Supp. at 345, 356 n.28.
112. Id. at 345.
113. Id. "LACH challenged as unconstitutional the regulation's distinction between
solicitation for charitable, religious, or political causes and solicitation of alms by private
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In response to the district court's concern over several vague
and ambiguous phrases in the regulation," 4 the TA revised the
regulation to specifically state that "[n]o person shall panhandle
or beg upon any facility or conveyance." '"15 Additionally, under §
1050.6(c), the revised regulation identified what the require-
ments were for obtaining a permit for "charitable solicita-
tion."11 In response to the plaintiffs' motion, the court granted
a temporary restraining order prohibiting the TA from enforcing
§ 1050.6 pending the outcome of its decision. 117
The court then wrote to the state attorney general, sua
sponte, inviting him to intervene.118 The court questioned the
constitutionality of New York Penal Law § 240.35(1),"' a loiter-
ing statute. 1' 0 After Attorney General Robert Abrams declined
to intervene in the suit,' the court directed the plaintiff to file
an amended complaint challenging the New York statute and
naming Attorney General Abrams as a defendant.' The court
then granted a motion filed by the Legal Aid Society to inter-
vene on behalf of Sheron Gilmore,'2 3 another homeless person.'24
individuals. On this basis, LACH argued that the total ban on begging and panhandling
in the subway system was constitutionally impermissible." Id.
114. The district court questioned whether the statute could survive a constitutional
challenge for vagueness in distinguishing between "solicit alms" and "solicit for charita-
ble purposes." The court also questioned whether provisions had been made to accom-
modate the phrase that soliciting would be prohibited "unless duly authorized by the
Authority." Specifically, the court questioned whether any procedural standards had
been set up by the TA for the granting or denial of such authority. Id.
115. N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.6(b)(2) (1989).
116. Id. § 1050.6(c).
117. Young, 729 F. Supp. at 346.
118. Id.
119. Section 240.35(1) states that "[A] person is guilty of loitering when he . . .
[1]oiters, remains or wanders about in a public place for the purpose of begging." N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 240.35(1) (McKinney 1979).
120. Young, 729 F. Supp. at 346.
121. Young, 903 F.2d at 151.
122. Id.
123. The brief for the plaintiff-intervenor describes Sheron Gilmore as a needy New
York resident who "relies in part on money she collects by begging to provide herself
with food and other life necessities .... She also solicits money that she uses for carfare
to take her to a medical clinic, which she reports to regularly for treatment for a respira-
tory ailment." Brief for the Plaintiff-Intervenor at 2, 5, Young v. New York City Transit
Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d. Cir. 1990) (Nos. 1170, 1171, and 1202).
124. The motion by the Legal Aid Society was opposed by the TA and LACH on the
grounds that Ms. Gilmore was a member of the class of people already represented by
plaintiffs Walley and Young and that her intervention was not necessary. The district
21
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On December 27, 1989, the plaintiffs filed an amended com-
plaint, challenging the constitutionality of the loitering statute,
§ 240.35(1), and naming Robert Abrams, the Long Island Rail-
road, and Port Authority as defendants. 125
At the direction of the court the plaintiffs again amended
the complaint on January 22, 1990, to include the chairman and
all twelve commissioners of the Port Authority as defendants.
The plaintiffs also changed the word "homeless" in the original
class description to "all needy persons" who live in New York
and beg or panhandle in the transit facilities.
121
The district court issued its decision on January 25, 1990.127
court, however, stated that "the case is a very difficult and important case and . . . the
court would welcome the additional resource which the Legal Aid Society can provide."
Young, 903 F.2d at 151.
125. Id. The challenge to § 240.35(1) was based on the defendants' claim that the
transit police, in carrying out their duties as peace officers, were merely enforcing this
section of the state penal law. Young, 729 F. Supp. at 346. In their amended complaint,
the plaintiffs stated:
Defendants' content-based ban on solicitation of charity by the homeless or needy,
whether pursuant to 21 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 21, §§ 1050.6, 1220.16
(Rule 9 of the "World Trade Center and Port Authority Bus Terminal, Revised
Rules and Regulations"), 1220.25 and 1290.3, N.Y. Penal Law § 240.35, or any
other law, rule or regulation, which discriminates against plaintiffs, by prohibiting
them from asking for charity, but allowing others to do so, violates the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, §§ 8 and 11
of the New York State Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.
Amended Complaint for the Plaintiffs at 19-20, para. 49, Young v. New York City
Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (No. 89 CIV. 7871 (LBS)).
With respect to the addition of the Long Island Railroad and the Port Authority of
New York as defendants in the action, the Port Authority has jurisdiction over both the
Port Authority Bus Terminal and the World Trade Center. The Long Island Railroad is
a subsidiary of the MTA. The plaintiffs asserted that various rules of the World Trade
Center and the Port Authority violated the New York State and the United States Con-
stitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs cited N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1220.16
(1973) ("No person shall solicit funds or contributions for any purpose at the [Port Au-
thority Bus] Terminal without permission") as well as N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
21, § 1220.25 (1973) ("No person, unless duly authorized by the Port Authority, shall, in.
. the [Port Authority Bus] Terminal... solicit alms") and N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 21, § 1290.3 (1973) ("No person at the World Trade Center, unless duly authorized in
writing by the Port Authority, shall . . . solicit funds for any purpose"). Young, 729 F.
Supp. at 347 n.9.
Although the Port Authority claimed that it issued permits on a first-come, first-
served basis, the plaintiffs noted that because the Port Authority interpreted § 240.35(1)
to prohibit begging and panhandling, the Port Authority did not issue any permits for
these activities. Id. at 347.
126. Young, 729 F. Supp. at 347.
127. See id. Judge Leonard Sand wrote the opinion for the court.
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The court granted the plaintiffs' motions to include all twelve
commissioners and to change the name of the class of people
being represented in the suit. ' The court held § 240.35(1) of
the New York Penal Law to be violative of the due process
clause of the New York State Constitution.""9
After rejecting the claim that § 240.35(1) was a necessary
predicate for regulating begging, the court proceeded to consider
the constitutional validity of the Transit Authority and Port Au-
thority regulations, 21 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1050.6 (Transit Authority)
and 21 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 1220.16, 1220.25, and 1290.3 (Port Author-
ity).'3 0 The court began its analysis by addressing whether beg-
ging and panhandling were activities worthy of First Amend-
ment protection.'' Basing its decision heavily on the Supreme
Court's holding in Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment,'3 ' the court held that begging was a form of speech wor-
thy of protection under the First Amendment.'3 3
128. Id. at 347. The new class was defined as "all needy persons who live in the
State of New York, who are or will be asking or soliciting others for charity for their own
benefit in the train, bus or subway stations of New York City or all other places within
the jurisdiction of the defendants where this is presently prohibited." Id.
129. Id. at 349. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the due process test
for loitering statutes used by the New York State Court of Appeals in People v. Bright,
71 N.Y.2d 376, 520 N.E.2d 1355, 526 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1988). Under this test, statutes are
upheld only if "they either prohibit loitering for a specific illegal purpose or loitering in a
specific place of restricted access." Id. at 1355. Because a public place cannot be consid-
ered a place of restricted access and because the court found that begging by itself was
not unlawful conduct, the court held § 240.35(1) to fail this test. Young, 729 F. Supp. at
349.
130. Young, 729 F. Supp. at 350.
131. Id.
132. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
133. Young, 729 F. Supp. at 360. Specifically, the court noted that "a meaningful
distinction cannot be drawn for First Amendment purposes between solicitations for
charity and begging." Id. at 352. Focusing on the meaning of the word "charity," the
court noted that there was nothing in the dictionary which suggested that money given
to a soliciting beggar did not qualify as charity. Id. at 353. Therefore, the court noted
that whether a donation is solicited by a needy person or a fundraiser would not be a
factor in determining whether the solicitation was for charity. Id. Instead, the court pro-
posed that in determining whether something should be categorized as charity it would
be more appropriate to look at the motive and intent of the donor, not that of the donee
or recipient. Id. at 353 n.21. By looking only to the intent of the recipient in distinguish-
ing between charitable and noncharitable solicitation, the court noted that it would be
conceivable that one could prevent one needy person from begging or panhandling for
himself, but would have to allow the activity if two needy people were to work together,
each soliciting funds for the other. Id. at 353.
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After holding that begging was worthy of protection ,under
the First Amendment, the court proceeded to determine the
proper forum classification for the subway system. The question
to be decided was whether the transit system areas at issue were
traditional or designated public forums.'34 After reviewing prece-
dent in this area, the court held that the transit system was a
designated public forum.135 A time, place, and manner analysis
by the court then demonstrated that the governmental interests
asserted by the defendants were not tailored narrowly enough to
justify the restricted conduct.'
134. Id. at 356.
135. Id. at 359. In reaching this conclusion that the subway system was a designated
public forum, the court determined that the Second Circuit's decision in Gannett Satel-
lite Info. Network v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1984), which
held that MTA stations are neither designated nor traditional public fora, was of little
precedential value because the decision was issued prior to the amendment of the TA
regulation at issue in this case. Id. at 357. The Gannett court held that "MTA stations to
be appropriate forums for newsrack newspaper sales, but that placing a licensing fee
levied on these newsracks was a permissible manner restriction given the substantial gov-
ernment interest in raising revenue." Id. at 357 n.33.
Instead, the court found its primary support in classifying the subway system as a
designated public forum from the Second Circuit's 1968 decision in Wolin v. Port of New
York Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 89-91 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968). In Wo-
lin, the court held the Port Authority Terminal to be an appropriate forum for distribut-
ing leaflets, carrying signs, and engaging in discussions with those passing through the
terminal. Id. The Wolin court determined the terminal to be an ideal environment for
First Amendment activity given the many people who passed through each day. Id. at
90-91. Based on this rationale, the district court in Young found it to be indisputable
that the Port Authority as well as all transit facilities similar to it had become public
fora. Young, 729 F. Supp. at 356.
136. With respect to the TA's interest in protecting the public from harassment and
intimidation, the court concluded that neither the TA regulation nor the Port Author-
ity's refusal to issue permits to beggars was narrowly tailored to serve the asserted gov-
ernment interest. Id. at 358. First, the court noted that no attempt had been made by
either group to distinguish between the passive and aggressive beggar. Id. The district
court also noted that the TA had other regulations at its disposal to prohibit any aggres-
sive activity in the subway system. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that no attempt had
been made to identify which areas of the subway system were more prone to passenger
intimidation. Id.
Accordingly, the court concluded:
While the government has an interest in "preserving the quality of urban life, ...
and in protecting citizens from "unwanted exposure to certain methods of expres-
sion which may legitimately be deemed a public nuisance, . . . this interest must
be discounted where the regulation has the principal effect of keeping a public
problem involving human beings out of sight and therefore out of mind. Indeed, it
is the very unsettling appearance and message conveyed by the beggars that gives
their conduct its expressive quality. Of course, the fact that expression is "objec-
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In accordance with its decision, the district court prelimina-
rily enjoined the defendants from enforcing "any prohibition on
begging, panhandling or soliciting alms" pursuant to 21
N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 1050.6, 1220.25, 1290.3, 1220.16 and 240.35(1) of
the New York Penal Law. 3 7 On February 2, 1990, the court con-
verted the preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction. 138
In addition, the court ordered that pending the outcome on ap-
peal, begging and panhandling in the subway system would be
allowed under the same time, place, and manner restrictions as
those for charitable organizations under § 1050.6(c).3 s
On February 7, 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit granted a stay of the district court's judg-
ment pending the Court of Appeals' decision on appeal. 140
B. Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit
The Second Circuit, in a two to one decision, "' reversed the
district court's judgment, holding it highly unlikely that begging
was a form of speech worthy of First Amendment protection. 42
After applying the O'Brien test to the facts of the case, the court
upheld the constitutionality of 21 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1050.6 and va-
cated the district court's order enjoining enforcement of the reg-
ulation.' 43 The court also dismissed the portion of the complaint
tionable to some ... does not diminish its protected status .
Id. at 358-59 (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986));
see Members of The City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
805 (1984); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 85 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
Moreover, the court concluded that any fear asserted by the TA regarding possible
fraudulent activity by the individual beggars was not a relevant issue. Young, 729 F.
Supp. 359. The court noted when a donor gives money to a beggar, he can be confident
that in all likelihood, the beggar will keep the money. Id. at 359.
137. Young, 729 F. Supp. at 360. Because the Port Authority regulations relied upon
the validity of § 240.35(1), these regulations were found to be unconstitutional. Id. at
359.
138. Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 152 (2d Cir. 1990).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Judge Altimari wrote the opinion for the majority in which Judge Timber
joined. Judge Meskill wrote a dissenting opinion.
142. Id. at 153.
143. Id. at 164.
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challenging § 240.35(1) of the New York Penal Law. 144
1. The Majority
The court noted that case law supports the proposition that
not all expressive conduct constitutes speech which is protected
by the First Amendment. 14 5 The court held that a "common
sense" analysis of begging supports a conclusion that this activ-
ity resembles "conduct" more than it does "speech."' 46 In apply-
ing the test established in Spence v. Washington147 to the con-
duct of begging, the court concluded that begging is not
"inseparably intertwined with a 'particularized message,' and
that most individuals are not [begging] to convey any social or
political message."' 48 Rather, they beg to collect money. 49 The
court noted that there hardly seems to be a 'great likelihood'
that the subway passengers who witness the conduct are able to
discern what the particularized message might be."'150
The court contrasted Young with Texas v. Johnson,"'
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict,15' and several other cases.153 In each of these cases, the
court found the conduct conveyed a clear expressive message
worthy of First Amendment protection. 54 The atmosphere of
144. Id.
145. Id. at 152. The court cited United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968),
which rejected the "view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea." Young, 903 F.2d at 152-53.
146. Young, 903 F.2d at 153. The court supported this by quoting Justice Scalia's
dissent in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622 (D.C. Cir.
1983): "That this should seem a bold assertion is a commentary upon how far judicial
and scholarly discussion of this basic constitutional guarantee has strayed from common
and common-sense understanding." Young, 903 F.2d at 153.
147. 418 U.S. 405 (1974). See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the test set forth by the Court in Spence.
148. Young, 903 F.2d at 153 (quoting Spence, 478 U.S. at 410-11).
149. Id.
150. Young, 903 F.2d at 153-54.
151. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
152. 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (involving students wearing black armbands in protest
of Vietnam War).
153. Young, 903 F.2d at 152-54.
154. Other cases mentioned by the court were Amalgamated Food Employees Union
Local 509 v. Logan Valley Plaza Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (involving union members
picketing peacefully in shopping center to protest unfair labor practices), and Brown v.
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the New York subway system, however, was not found to be con-
ducive to any possible message a beggar may try to convey.1 55
Even though the court recognized that one can find "some ker-
nel of expression in almost every activity ... such a kernel is not
sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First
Amendment. Furthermore, any conversation would be inciden-
tal - speech is not necessary to, nor is it inherent to, the act of
begging." 56
The court found the district court's reliance on the trilogy
of charitable organization cases - Schaumburg v. Citizens for
a Better Environment,157 Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson15 8 and
Riley v. National Federation of the Blind1 59 - to be misplaced
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (involving five black people conducting a library sit-in to
protest the segregation policy of the library). Young, 903 F.2d at 153.
155. Young, 903 F.2d at 154. The court of appeals held that "begging in the subway
is experienced as transgressive conduct whether devoid of or inclusive of an intent to
convey a particularized message." Id. The court reached its conclusion based on informa-
tion provided primarily through a passenger study conducted by the TA in 1988. Id. The
TA study addressed "quality of life problems" experienced by subway passengers while
in the subway system and stated that beggars in the subway contribute to the public's
perception that the subway system is dangerous. Id. at 149.
Part of the TA study included a survey conducted by Peter Harris, which confirmed
the additional hazards perceived by riders because of the presence of beggars. Id. The
Harris survey also found that two-thirds of all subway passengers have been intimidated
into giving money to beggars and panhandlers. Id.
An outside consulting firm retained by the TA confirmed that begging and panhan-
dling is a problem in the subway system. The court of appeals discussed the conclusions
reached by Professor George Kelling, president of the consulting firm, in its opinion:
[Blehavior such as begging generates "high levels of fear in the passengers,
thereby discouraging use of the system." . . . Open city streets allow pedestrians
what sociologists term "fate-control", or the ability to avoid and move away from
an intimidating person. To the contrary, subway riders enjoy considerably less flu-
idity of movement and ability to control what happens to them. Whether standing
in the crush of riders in a speeding subway car, waiting among the pressing masses
on a platform, or swarming with the throng through a maze of mezzanines, stair-
cases and ramps, the rider feels "captive". As a result... "in the subway environ-
ment, begging is inherently aggressive even if not patently so." In addition . . .
begging not only intimidates passengers, but also "has the serious potential of cre-
ating an accident and injuring many people." . . . [T]he act of placing a cup before
persons is often disruptive, startling and potentially dangerous.
Id. at 149-50.
156. Id. at 154. (quoting Dallas v. Stanglin, 488 U.S. 861 (1989)).
157. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
158. 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
159. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
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because none of these cases discussed begging. 160 The court dis-
tinguished organized solicitation for charities from begging. 6'
The court reasoned that the primary goal of begging is to obtain
money, whereas organized charities are concerned with dissemi-
nating information and gathering support. 6 ' According to the
majority, "there is a sufficient nexus between solicitation by or-
ganized charities and a 'variety of speech interests' to invoke
protection under the First Amendment;" this same nexus, how-
ever, does not exist with begging.6 3 The court noted that beg-
ging, unlike charitable solicitation, is not necessarily "inter-
twined with speech."'6 4
The court noted that the TA clearly distinguished between
beggars and charitable organizations when it amended §
1050.6.15 In amending the regulation, "based on its experience,
the TA drew a distinction between the harmful effects caused by
individual begging and the First Amendment interests associ-
ated with solicitation by organized charities."' 6 The TA deter-
mined that while solicitation by organized charities could be
contained to certain areas in the subway system, "the problems
posed by begging and panhandling could be addressed by noth-
160. Young, 903 F.2d at 155. The court noted:
The district court apparently assumed that the outcome of the three Supreme
Court cases would have been the same if, instead of involving door-to-door solici-
tation by organized charities, they had involved begging and panhandling in the
subway. We think that the district court misconstrued the line of reasoning that
underpins the trilogy. . . . [N]either Schaumburg nor its progeny stand for the
proposition that begging and panhandling are protected speech under the First
Amendment.
Id.
161. Id. at 155-56.
162. Id. at 156.
163. Id. at 155.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 156. Specifically, the court of appeals brought attention to the results of
the TA study examined by the district court. This study provided the court of appeals
with proof that "subway passengers experience begging as intimidating, harassing and
threatening. Moreover, the passengers perceive that beggars and panhandlers pervade
the system .... Nowhere in the record is there any indication that passengers felt intimi-
dated by organized charities." Id.
166. Id. These interests include communication of information, dissemination and
propagation of views, and advocacy of causes. Id. Absent solicitation by charity, it is
possible that the flow of such information would cease. Id. at 155 (quoting Schaumburg,
444 U.S. at 632).
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ing less than the enforcement of a total ban. 1' 67
The court also noted that throughout history there have
been restraints on the places where beggars may beg.168 A review
of the historical treatment of beggars led the court to conclude
that "virtue is best served when it reflects an 'ordered
charity." "169
The court also addressed the constitutionality of the statute
under the premise that begging was a form of communication.1 0
The court's analysis under this premise still led it to conclude
that the statute is constitutionally valid.' The court examined
the facts under the O'Brien test 7 2 and reasoned that the ban
was appropriate given the strong governmental interest in pro-
viding a safe subway environment and the alternative forums
available for begging. 17 3
167. Young, 903 F.2d at 156.
168. Id. In its review of the treatment of beggars in history, the court of appeals
stated:
We are not unaware that the giving of alms has long been considered virtuous in
our Western tradition. In antiquity the humanist and jurist, Cicero, said of Cae-
sar: "Of all thy virtues none is more marvelous and graceful than charity." Some
centuries later the Christian thinker, Augustine of Hippo, observed that it is es-
sential to the virtue that "charity obeys reason, so that charity is vouchsafed in
such a way that justice is safeguarded, when we give to the needy." In Medieval
times the Jewish philosopher, Moses Maimonides, espoused a charity such that
"no contribution should be made without the donor feeling confident that the ad-
ministration is honest, prudent and capable of management." The district court
itself stated that "[iun early English common law, begging by those able to work
was prohibited, but beggars who were unable to work were licensed and restricted
to specific areas." Thus, while there can be no doubt that giving alms is virtuous,
in the Eastern tradition there is also no doubt that the virtue is best served when
it reflects an "ordered charity." It does not seem to us that the TA's regulation of
solicitation and ban on begging are inconsistent with the concept.
Id. at 156.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 157.
171. Id. at 161.
172. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). For a discussion of the four
O'Brien factors, see supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. The Young court deter-
mined that the O'Brien test would be appropriate since the government interest (i.e.
passenger safety) in enacting the regulation was unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. Young, 903 F.2d at 157.
173. With respect to the four O'Brien factors, the court of appeals held that the first
factor, requiring that the regulation be within the constitutional power of the govern-
ment, was not at issue in the case. Id. at 158. With respect to the second factor, requiring
that the regulation further an important or substantial governmental interest, the court
found that the regulation served to advance substantial governmental interests. The gov-
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Disagreeing with the district court, the Court of Appeals
found that the subway system is not a public forum. 174 The
Court of Appeals noted that "[i]n the face of Operation Enforce-
ment, there can be no doubt that the TA intended to continue
its long-standing prohibition of begging and panhandling even
after revising the regulation to permit solicitation by organiza-
tions. '17 The court reasoned that permitting limited discourse
does not turn a nontraditional forum into an open public forum:
[I]t is permissible for the TA to limit solicitation in the subway
system to organizations. "[A] public forum may be created by
government designation of a place or channel of communication
for use by the public at large for assembly and speech, for use by
certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects. '176
The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional chal-
lenge of § 240.35 of the New York Penal Law.177 First, the Court
of Appeals held that the district court did not have jurisdiction
to decide the issue due to the failure of the plaintiffs to allege an
actual case or controversy as required under Article III of the
United States Constitution. 17 Further, the Court of Appeals de-
ernment has a substantial interest in protecting the multitude of people (estimated at
over three million) who ride the subway daily, the majority of whom feel threatened and
intimidated by beggars and panhandlers. Id. The court also noted that the conduct of
beggars is disruptive and could contribute to accidents in the system. Id. Therefore, the
court found that the TA's conclusion that begging is "alarmingly harmful conduct" was
not unreasonable, and that "the district court's analysis reflected an exacerbated defer-
ence to the alleged individual rights of beggars and panhandlers to the great detriment
of the common good." Id.
With respect to the third O'Brien factor, requiring that the governmental interest be
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, the court found that the government
interests in enacting the regulation were indeed not related to the suppression of free
expression, and were, therefore, content neutral. Id. In applying the facts of the case to
the fourth factor, requiring the restriction on the First Amendment freedom at issue to
be no greater than is necessary to the furtherance of the government interest involved,
the court found that the exigencies created by begging and panhandling in the subway
warranted the complete prohibition of the conduct. Id. at 159.
174. Id. at 161 (citing Gannett Satellite Info. Network v. Metropolitan Transp.
Auth., 745 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1984)).
175. Young, 903 F.2d at 161.
176. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. at
802). See also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 36, 46 n.7
(1983) (a designated public forum "may be created for a limited purpose such as use by a
certain group").
177. Young, 903 F.2d at 162.
178. Id. at 162.
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termined that the district court would not have had subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over the issue even if the plaintiffs had alleged a
justiciable case or controversy. 179
2. The Concurrence/Dissent
Judge Meskill concurred with the majority's decision re-
garding § 240.35 of the New York Penal Law. 180 Judge Meskill
also agreed that common sense should be used in the court's
First Amendment analysis.1 81 However, he 'believed that a true
common sense analysis indicated that both beggars and repre-
sentatives of organized charities have only one goal in mind
when they solicit funds in the subway system - obtaining
money.1 82 Given this common goal, Judge Meskill argued that
under Schaumburg beggars deserve the same First Amendment
protection as organized charities. 83
According to Judge Meskill, Shaumburg did not hold that
speech is necessary for charitable solicitation to be protected
under the First Amendment.184 The dissent reasoned:
[C]harities receive countless donations without engaging in any
discussion whatsoever with the typical donor rushing to catch a
train.... First Amendment protection attaches to all charitable
solicitation, whether or not any speech incident to the solicitation
actually takes place, because a sufficient nexus exists between a
charity's expression of ideas and its fundraising.1 85
179. Id. at 163-64. "The fact that the TA's prohibition on begging is unconnected to
the New York Penal Law deprives the [plaintiffs'] claims of the requisite 'common nu-
cleus of operative fact' for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction." Id. at 164. See United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); United States v. Town of North Hemp-
stead, 610 F.2d 1025, 1029-30 (2d Cir. 1979).
180. Young, 903 F.2d at 164 (Meskill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 165.
184. Id. Judge Meskill noted that if speech were a required element for charitable
solicitation, it is unlikely that the fundraising activity of any charitable solicitor in the
subway system would be protected. Id. at 164. It is commonly known that many of these
solicitors receive donations without any exchange of words between the donor and them-
selves because the donors are often hurrying to the catch their trains. Id.
185. Id. The court described this nexus by pointing out that representatives of or-
ganized charities often have the opportunity to explain and discuss the purpose and
goals of their respective charity. Id.
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Under this rationale, the dissent emphasized that begging is
worthy of the same First Amendment protection as solicitation
by organized charities. 186 Judge Meskill further supported this
conclusion by noting that beggars often speak with people to in-
form them of their struggle to survive and the plight of the
homeless.' 87 Therefore, there is no distinction between beggars
who speak when begging and those who do not, just as there is
no distinction between representatives of charitable organiza-
tions who speak when soliciting funds and those who do not. 8
Because charitable organizations are protected by the First
Amendment, beggars should be protected as well.'
Judge Meskill agreed with the majority that the regulations
were content neutral. 9 ° However, he disagreed that the O'Brien
test was the proper standard to be applied.' He agreed with
the district court that begging should be a protected activity in
the same way that charitable solicitation is protected. Therefore,
any direct restriction should be "subjected ... to exacting First
Amendment scrutiny."'92 The dissent pointed out that the
O'Brien test and the time, place, and manner test are similar
and, therefore, either could be used.1 93 Judge Meskill noted,
however, that O'Brien is usually used with cases involving sym-
186. Id.
187. Id. The dissent cited the individual affidavits of plaintiffs Young, Walley, and
Gilmore in support of this conclusion. Each of the three plaintiffs stated in their affida-
vits that they often discuss the problems of the homeless and needy people of New York
with the people whom they approach for money. Id. at 165.
188. Id.
189. Id.
Any attempt to distinguish between beggars who hold signs or engage in discus-
sions and those who simply ask for money would be unrealistic. Accordingly, if
First Amendment protection extends to charitable solicitation unaccompanied by
speech, as it apparently does, it must extend to begging as well.... To hold other-
wise would mean that an individual's plight is worthy of less protection in the eyes
of the law than the interests addressed by an organized group.
Id. at 165-67.
190. Id. at 166. "Defendants have offered substantial evidence to support their claim
that the regulations are aimed at the secondary effects of begging such as increased
crime and traffic congestion, rather than at any message conveyed by the beggars." Id.
191. Id. The dissent questioned whether the more "relaxed" standard of O'Brien
should automatically be applied simply because the regulation is deemed to be content
neutral. Id.
192. Id. (quoting Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988)).
193. Young, 903 F.2d at 66 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
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bolic conduct, not expressive conduct.""
Because Judge Meskill believed that the fourth element of
the O'Brien test was specifically geared to a symbolic speech
analysis, he chose to apply a time, place, and manner test to the
expressive conduct involved in Young. Under this analysis,
Judge Meskill found the regulation invalid.'19 He noted that the
TA had created a limited public forum "by designating certain
areas of the subway system in which charitable solicitation may
take place." '
The Young dissent also agreed with the district court that
Gannett Satellite Information Network v. Metropolitan Trans-
portation Authority'9 was of little precedential value.'" s Gan-
nett held that commuter stations were neither traditional nor
designated public forums.' 9 The TA's subsequent amendment,
however, specifically designated subways as public forums.200
Judge Meskill therefore proposed that the standard for trans-
portation facilities set up in Wolin v. New York Authority20 '
was applicable. 02 Wolin suggested that Port Authority Bus Ter-
194. Judge Meskill referred specifically to Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 797 (1989), where the Court referred to O'Brien as "the case in which we established
the standard for judging the validity of restrictions on expressive conduct." Id. Judge
Meskill stated that the protected expression in the case at bar was the "beggar's speech
incident to their solicitation of alms, not symbolic conduct." Young, 903 F.2d at 166
(Meskill, J., dissenting).
195. Id.
196. Id. Judge Meskill noted:
The TA clearly has created a limited public forum by designating certain areas of
the subway system in which charitable solicitation may take place. The majority
emphasizes that the TA never intended to open the subway to begging, and that
the grant of selective access does not create a public forum for all purposes. While
the government's intent is "critical" to the determination that a limited public
forum was created . . . the fact is defendants intended to open, and did open,
certain areas to solicitation by organized charities.
Id. at 166.
Because Judge Meskill argued that the TA opened certain areas for organized chari-
ties, making these areas designated public forums, these areas are, therefore, also appro-
priate for the beggar. Id. at 167. He felt that there was no difference between the type of
speech carried on by organized charities and the speech of the beggar for First Amend-
ment purposes. Id.
197. 745 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984).
198. Young, 903 F.2d at 167.
199. 745 F.2d at 773.
200. Young, 903 F.2d at 167.
201. 392 F.2d 83, 88-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
202. 903 F.2d at 167.
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minal was a public forum.2 °3 Since the majority did not dispute
Wolin, the dissent reasoned that it was still valid.2"'
Judge Meskill then addressed whether the regulation could
survive the appropriate level of scrutiny. "Content-neutral regu-
lations like the ones in question will be upheld as reasonable
time, place, or manner restrictions if they are 'narrowly tailored
to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample
alternative channels of communication.' ",205 Judge Meskill ar-
gued that although significant governmental interests were pre-
sent, the regulation was not narrow enough for a content-neutral
restriction. 0 The dissent acknowledged that the prevention of
passenger harassment by beggars and panhandlers, as well as
preservation of quality of life and the maintenance of a safe
transit system, are important.207 Judge Meskill noted that no
distinction had been made in the regulation between the passive
blind man and the harassing beggar.20 8 Therefore, "the regula-
tions are not narrowly tailored to achieve these [significant] in-
terests because they burden a substantial amount of speech that
does not implicate the TA's interests. ' 20 9 Moreover, the TA had
failed to show that passengers perceive beggars as "belligerent or
frightening ' 210 and had failed to show that passengers do not
feel harassed when approached by representatives from organ-
ized charities.21" '
Hence, the dissent argued that the TA should only be al-
lowed to prohibit specific conduct that adversely affects passen-
ger safety, and should address the safety concerns of passengers
by restricting beggars to the same areas where charitable solici-
tation is allowed.2 12 Judge Meskill acknowledged, however, that
if the regulation had not been amended to allow charitable orga-
nizations to solicit funds in the subway, no public forum would
203. Id. (citing Wolin, 392 F.2d at 88-91).
204. Young, 903 F.2d at 167.
205. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n 460 U.S. 36, 45
(1983)).
206. Young, 903 F.2d at 167.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 168.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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have been created. Had the regulation been reviewed under
those circumstances, he would have upheld the regulation's
validity.21 3
C. The United States Supreme Court
On November 26, 1990, the Supreme Court of the United
States denied certiorari for Young v. New York City Transit
Authority.2 14 No comments or dissents regarding the Court's de-
cision were publicly reported. 1 5
IV. Analysis
The majority decision has significant weaknesses.2"' The
Court of Appeals' decision to prohibit begging and panhandling
in the subway may be justified given the substantial governmen-
tal interests of passenger safety and the right of passengers to be
free from harassment.21 7 However, the reasoning of the majority
lacks clarity and conviction, and is an unrealistic holding be-
213. Id.
214. 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990).
215. Id.
216. Media reactions to the court's decision support both sides of the argument. See
Correct Decision to Ban Beggars, S.F. CHRON., May 14, 1990, at A18 (final ed.):
Free speech is a precious right and to say it. does not apply to some activities
in public places is a decision not to be taken lightly. But in this case the court is
correct in deciding that aggressive begging is not free speech. It can constitute a
threat to personal safety and liberty.
A subway system exists to move passengers quickly and safely. Passengers
have the right to use the trains and stations without harassment. This means that
a BART passenger should be able to open his or her wallet or purse in a public
place to buy a ticket without fear.
Id; but see Kempton, Charity, Thy Cup is Empty, NEWSDAY, May 13, 1990, at 3:
A few of those hissings and slitherings that intimate the presence of the
snakes of meanness of spirit are rather too audible in the cadences sounded in
U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Frank X. Altimari's affirmation of the New York
City Transit Authority's ban on panhandling on its subways. ...
In essence, the Court of Appeals has ruled that individuals cannot beg in the
subways, but that organized charities can. Every schoolboy ought by now to be
familiar with Anatole France's observation that the law in its majestic equality
forbids both the rich and the poor to sleep under bridges. We must now adjust
that doctrine's revision into: "The law's commonsensical inequity henceforth for-
bids the penniless and licenses the propertied to beg in the subway."
Id.
217. Young, 903 F.2d at 168 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
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cause it presents enforcement problems.218
The majority decision is weak in its failure to distinguish in
a convincing manner the difference between solicitation by char-
itable organizations and begging for oneself.2 19 The majority de-
cision expressed "grave doubt" that begging could be a constitu-
tionally protected form of speech. The court based its decision
on a trilogy of charitable organization cases and "common
sense."220 In support of its position, however, it offered a con-
clusory opinion that a beggar extending his hand is not commu-
nicating a message worthy of First Amendment protection to the
same degree as a representative of an organized charity soliciting
funds.22" '
The court correctly noted that Schaumburg held that even
representatives of charitable organizations who solicit without
speaking are protected under the First Amendment.22 Indeed,
there appears to be very little difference, if any at all, between
the silent solicitor representing a charitable organization and the
silent beggar passively standing in the subway.
The majority decision is further weakened by its application
of the O'Brien test.223 First, an application of the O'Brien test
would have been unnecessary if the majority had supported its
assertion that begging is unworthy of First Amendment protec-
tion, rather than merely expressing "grave doubt" as to its pro-
tected status. In addition, because the O'Brien test is usually ap-
plied to cases involving symbolic conduct, it is questionable
whether the O'Brien test is appropriate in this case. 224 Finally,
218. See infra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
219. Id. Judge Meskill concluded that his argument by once again expressing his
concern with the majority's failure to distinguish charitable solicitation from begging: "I
simply fail to see why the TA should be able to permit organized charities, but not beg-
gars, to rattle a cup full of change as one passes by." Id.
220. Id. at 153-56.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 165.
223. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
224. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1174 (11th ed. 1988) ("[T]he War-
ren Court's symbolic speech decisions suggest not only uncertainty but also instability of
doctrinal foundations."); John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482,
1486 n.17 (1975) (noting that nothing in the Court's response to the substantiality re-
quirement suggests that this requirement will not always be satisfiable); William E. Lee,
Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court: The Doctrine of Time,
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the validity of the O'Brien test itself has been questioned as
well.225
However, even assuming that an application of the O'Brien
test was appropriate, the majority failed to show that the weight
of the government's interest in passenger safety was sufficient.2 6
The majority also failed to show that people are intimidated by
beggars.227 The court based its conclusion on only one TA
study.228 Furthermore, the majority never addressed whether
people feel intimidated or harassed by representatives of chari-
table organizations.22 9
However, the dissent weakened its own analysis when it
failed to reconcile its decision with the opposite conclusion
reached by the Supreme Court in Clark v. Community for Crea-
tive Non-Violence.2 30 In Clark, a regulation prohibiting sleeping
in nondesignated parks was upheld in light of the government's
Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 757, 784 (1986)
(noting that the court in O'Brien only concluded that the governmental interest was not
imaginary).
225. GUNTHER, supra note 218.
226. Young, 903 F.2d at 168 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
227. Id.
228. GUNTHER, supra note 218. In response to the results of the study, the plaintiffs
submitted an affidavit from Robert N. Bontempo, an assistant professor at Columbia
Graduate School of Business, a purported expert in survey and methodology research.
Mr. Bontempo's affidavit offered harsh criticism of the methodology used in the study:
The TA Survey contains several critical flaws which are the hallmark of a biased
instrument. The TA Survey is most accurately interpreted, not as an impartial
attempt to uncover the public's attitudes, but rather as a slanted instrument
designed to provide support for a predetermined point of view.... The role intim-
idation plays in giving, however, is completely misrepresented by [Mr. Harris']
reliance on the responses to these questions .... [Tihe TA Survey only gave the
respondents the option of reporting degrees of intimidation. . . . In summary,
there are various technical flaws in the TA Survey which artificially inflate the
complaints against the homeless. Despite this, the TA Survey Report clearly
shows that the public views beggars more with sympathy than fear. If panhandling
has any deleterious effects on the transit system, according to the survey those
effects are not of concern to the vast majority of subway riders. The vast majority
of riders do not want increased police sanctions against beggars, and clearly con-
sider other problems such as loud radios, delays, and dirt as far more serious
problems in the subway.
Affidavit of Robert N. Bontempo, Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp.
341 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (No. 89 CIV. 7871).
229. Young, 903 F.2d at 161.
230. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
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interest in maintaining the parks in good condition23 1 The regu-
lation in Clark was a blanket prohibition which affected all
types of individuals who might choose to sleep in the park.2 32
Similarly, the regulation in Young was directed at all types of
beggars, both the passive and the aggressive.2 33 According to the
Supreme Court, the blanket regulation in Clark was not over-
broad.234 In addition, the government interest in Clark was rec-
ognized by the Court without requiring any justification by the
state.238
Given the volatile and controversial nature of free speech
issues in general, any court decision is bound to receive both
positive and negative reactions.213 As expected, the majority's
decision was welcomed by subway passengers, but viewed as
heartless23 7 by the homeless.2 38 Although the court used only one
TA study as evidence of passenger intimidation, the court's find-
ing that passengers are intimidated and feel harassed by beggars
and the homeless appears to be well-substantiated in the
media.23 9
231. Id. at 298-99.
232. Id. at 290.
233. Young, 903 F.2d at 160.
234. Clark, 468 U.S. at 296-97.
235. Id. at 296.
236. See Wright, supra note 26, at 57. The author noted:
Free speech case law permits the government to impose a wide range of restric-
tions on a similarly wide variety of forms of speech. Even if we were all to agree on
the precise purposes of, or functions served by the free speech clause, as well as on
what constitutes speech in the first place, correctly deciding many cases involving
government restriction would still be unavoidably difficult.
Id.
237. Id. (Perhaps this heartlessness stems from the fact that "the catchall name
homeless.., throws together in one menacing bundle not only destitute people who need
shelter but also AIDS victims, the mentally ill, drug and alcohol abusers, and street
predators of all kinds.").
238. See Carlyle Douglas, Freedom to Beg Ends at Turnstile, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
1990 § 4 at 7 ("In a ruling called hard-hearted by the homeless but welcomed by
thousands of straphangers, a Federal Appeals court ruled that constitutional free speech
guarantees do not cover requests for spare change."); see also Compassion and Con-
tempt, NEwsDAY, May 11, 1990, at 3 (city ed.) (most straphangers are pleased with the
ruling).
239. See Painton, supra note 1 ("Defenders of the homeless realize they face a
growing public relations problem."); Compassion and Contempt, NEWSDAY, May 11,
1990, at 3 (city ed.) ("Most straphangers... said they are intimidated by people begging.
... In a 1988 survey by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority about the quality of
life in the subways, riders ranked panhandling and homelessness among the top two is-
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The weaknesses in the majority decision may preclude it
from providing guidance to other communities facing similar
problems. Authorities in San Francisco were closely watching
the outcome of Young for a possible solution on how they might
deal with homeless beggars in the Bay Area Rapid Transit Sys-
tem.2 "° Subsequent to the Young decision, a similar case was
filed in San Francisco.2 4 More recently, the District of Columbia
police force used Young to support the rehabilitation of an old
and rarely used law to arrest panhandlers who solicit in affluent
neighborhoods. "2
The court's decision not only fails to provide guidance to
other jurisdictions, but it also fails to provide the homeless and
needy beggars with clear guidance concerning their rights. Ini-
tially, in October 1989, stronger enforcement measures were
taken to remove beggars from the subway system.2 " In February
1990, however, the beggars were told that their panhandling ac-
tivities in the subway system were forms of expression protected
by the First Amendment.24' The May 1990 Court of Appeals de-
sues that affect their comfort underground ... ").
240. See Correct Decisions to Ban Beggars, S.F. CHRON., May 14, 1990, at A18 ("In
recent months BART General Manager Frank J. Wilson has taken steps to clean up the
stations and trains and assign more police. The appellate court's decision shows that
BART is acting properly. Commuters have the constitutional right to be left alone and
ride in peace.").
241. Panhandlers Hope Supreme Court Will Be Generous, L. A. TIMES, May 12,
1990, at A18 (home ed.).
A similar case has been filed in federal court in San Francisco, where Celestus
Blair Jr., a formerly homeless man arrested five times for begging, has challenged
the city's enforcement of a 1961 California law that bans accosting others to solicit
alms. He argues that he did nothing more than ask people to help. . . . [The]
attorney representing Blair ... believes the cases in New York and California are
the only ones testing the issue in federal court.
Id.
242. Upset by Beggars, Washington is Arresting Them, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1990, at
A20. In response to complaints by the public regarding panhandlers in the streets, police
employed an old but still valid law to arrest nine panhandlers. Given the decision by the
court of appeals in Young, the Washington police department remained confident that
the law was constitutional. Id. An ACLU spokesman asserted, however, that it was likely
that the organization would challenge the ordinance. Id. Focusing on the impossibility of
distinguishing between the activity of individual beggars and organized charities, Mr.
Spitzer stated: "If somebody says to you, Buddy, can you spare a dime?, that's no less
free speech than if he says, Buddy, can you spare a dime for cancer research?" Id.
243. See N.Y. TiMES, supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
244. See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 352 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
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cision banned beggars again.2 ' s In light of the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari, this issue appears to be settled."" In actual-
ity, however, the rights of beggars remain in dispute because
Young failed to provide a definitive answer regarding the First
Amendment protection of begging.24 7 The court's decision cre-
ates a critical enforcement problem. As soon as the Court of Ap-
peals issued its decision, the TA police prepared for immediate
enforcement. The plan primarily consisted of either ejecting beg-
gars or issuing summonses. 4s The effectiveness of the plan was
immediately called into question, as some considered the plan
merely a way to move the beggars to another place, rather than
a solution to the problem.249 The practicalities of enforcement
were also questioned. 5 ° Concern was expressed that the lack of
245. See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 164 (2d Cir. 1990).
246. In June 1991, the Kings County Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the New York Transit Authority regulation under the New York State Constitution. Re-
lying in part on the Young decision, the court rejected claims that the regulation violated
the free speech, due process, and equal protection provisions of the New York State
Constitution. Walley v. New York City Transit Auth., N.Y.L.J., June 7, 1991, at 31, col.
2.
247. See When "Brother Can You Spare A Dime?" is a Crime, THE INDEPENDENT,
Dec. 7, 1990, at 19. The article notes that supporters of the homeless are determined not
to be silenced by the Court's affirmation of the transit regulation. Id. Given the increas-
ingly aggressive attempts by government officials to enforce the antivagrancy statutes in
the District of Columbia and continued attempts to control begging in San Francisco,
the article predicts that eventually the Supreme Court will have to address the issue of
First Amendment rights of beggars. Id. An ACLU spokesperson predicted that "[tihe
Supreme Court is going to be asked to hear this issue many times over the next few years
and to make up its mind." Id.
248. Panhandlers Hope Supreme Court Will Be Generous, L.A. TIMES, May 12,
1990, at A18, (home ed.) ("[A] spokesman for the 3,700-member transit authority police
force, said that in the wake of the appeals court decision his agency has been 'reinforcing
and informing our members that we expect them to vigorously pursue the panhandling
problem.' "). See Freedom to Beg Ends at Turnstile, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1990, § 4, at 7
("[A] crackdown would begin this week.... [Plolice officers were instructed to eject all
beggars from trains and subway stations and to arrest or issue summonses to those who
intimidated passengers. Transit officials said officers would be redeployed from adminis-
trative duties and concentrated on trains where panhandling is especially obnoxious.").
249. See Panhandlers Hope Supreme Court Will Be Generous, L.A. TIMES, May 12,
1990, at A18 (home ed.) (TA spokesman states: "We're not saying this is going to be a
cure-all .... We may just be moving the problem somewhere else.").
250. See How to Handle Subway Begging, NEWSDAY, May 18, 1990, Viewpoints, at
76 (city ed.):
Arrests don't make much sense. Begging... is not a heinous crime, and cops have
better things to do. . . . Summonses are often pointless because how can cops
make sure a beggar shows up in court .... [If you eject them] what's to stop them
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guidelines on how much force could be used might put passen-
gers in danger during the ejection process. 51 Another concern
was that the TA police's primary duty should be combatting
crime in the subway.25 ' Six months of ineffective enforcement
shows that the TA's plan is both inefficient and unworkable.5 3
By failing to adequately enforce its own decision, but re-
serving the state's right to remove the homeless, the Court of
Appeals' decision might be seen as merely another slight against
the homeless, rather than the passenger safety measure it pur-
ports to be.254 Further, one could interpret the Supreme Court's
decision to deny certiorari as a further blow to this unfortunate
group of people. By granting certiorari, the Supreme Court
could have remedied the weaknesses in the Court of Appeals de-
cision. 255 Instead, the Supreme Court chose to remain silent.2 56
from walking to the next station and coming right back in?
Id; see also Thomas A. Reppetto, About Crime, NEWSDAY, June 5, 1990, at 58:
Despite all the arguments in favor of keeping beggars out, however, the new en-
forcement efforts are likely to fail. First, there are the practical problems. A beg-
gar or other disorderly person ejected from a train or platform is liable simply to
enter another. If he or she is arrested, the courts will probably give short shrift to
what judges traditionally have seen as a minor matter. Indeed the cop's time in
processing arrests of beggars will cost more than a routine fine, which the city in
any event would have little chance of collecting.
Id.
251. See Transit Police to Eject Subway Panhandlers, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1990, at
B1, (final ed.) ("[T]ransit officers who attended the roll-call said that it was clear to
them that they should remove panhandlers at any cost, but they said that such rigorous
enforcement would take them off trains and away from subway platforms, at the expense
of riders' safety.").
252. See Compassion and Contempt, NEWSDAY, at 3 (city ed.) (TA should not
bother with panhandlers; rather, they should concern themselves with stopping robberies
in the subway.).
253. See Linda Greenhouse, Ban is Left Intact on Subway Begging, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 26, 1990, at Al. The article notes that the original plan to remove beggars was not a
solution to the problem of begging in the subway because the beggars returned to the
transit system immediately after ejection. Id. As a result, a new case-management ap-
proach has been designed, where professional social workers and community organiza-
tions will work with homeless to get them to shelters and provide follow-up help after
the TA police eject them from the subway system. Id. Some have criticized this method
as a solution that came "too late," while others have predicted that this new plan will
prove to be equally ineffective. Id. A spokesperson for LACH commented: "[W]e're not
going to solve the real problems by passing out sandwiches." Id.
254. After all, as was noted in Upset By Beggars, Washington is Arresting Them,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1990, at A20, "people aren't panhandling for fun."
255. Early reports published immediately after the Court of Appeals' decision pre-
dicted further legal discussion of the issue. See Panhandlers Hope Supreme Court Will
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One could argue that the silence of the Supreme Court justices
supports the Court of Appeals' ban on begging in the New York
City subway system and encourages further restrictions on beg-
ging in public areas throughout the country.2 57
V. Conclusion
In upholding the constitutionality of the TA regulation in
Young v. New York City Transit Authority,25" the Court of Ap-
peals has provided a way in which to silence beggars and pan-
handlers in the New York City subway system. Furthermore, by
denying certiorari, the Supreme Court has placed its stamp of
approval on the Court of Appeals decision. 59
In recognizing the potential impact of its decision, the Court
of Appeals stated: "[I]t is not the role of this court to resolve all
the problems of the homeless, as sympathetic as we may be.
260
Although it may not be the court's role to solve the problems of
the homeless, it is critical that the court does not contribute to
the problems of this unfortunate group by issuing flawed and
unsound decisions.
As a result of the Young decision, the First Amendment
rights of New York City's beggars have been silenced without
adequate justification. However, given the increasing number of
beggars and homeless in the United States, it is likely that the
issue of beggars' First Amendment rights will receive further
treatment by the courts in the future. Ultimately, the Supreme
Be Generous, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 1990, at A18 ("Homeless advocates say they expect to
appeal this case to the U.S. Supreme Court, where it could be the first federal test of
whether the Constitution affords protection to an occupation that dates back earlier than
biblical times."); Freedom to Beg Ends at Turnstile, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1990, § 4, at 7,
col. 3 (opining that the matter will probably be pursued to Supreme Court).
256. The failure of any of the Justices to comment on the decision to deny certiorari
was interpreted by at least one representative of the media to mean that none of the
Justices felt strongly enough to publicly voice their dissents, given the possibility that
any of them did in fact dissent. A Last Word for Some Silenced Beggars, WASH. POST,
Dec. 8, 1990, at A21 (final ed.).
257. See Court Lets Stand Ban on Begging in New York Subway, PROPRIETARY TO
THE UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 26, 1990 ("Advocates for the homeless claim the
court's refusal to review the policy could have a chilling impact on individual rights of
the destitute across the nation.").
258. 903 F.2d 146 (1990).
259. 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990).
260. Young, 903 F.2d at 156-57.
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Court will be forced to deal with the issue of whether begging is
a protected First Amendment activity. It is unfortunate that the
Court does not feel compelled at this time to publicly voice its
opinion.
Grace L. Zur*
* Dedicated to the memory of my mother, Hilde Paulina Zur.
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